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Abstract 
 
frican economic history is experiencing a renaissance, and South 
African economic history likewise. Combining newly transcribed 
large historical datasets with econometric techniques now standard in 
the economics literature, economic historians have greatly improved 
our understanding of South Africa’s development over the centuries. 
Yet many questions remain. This paper reviews the most recent 
contributions, several of which are published in this special issue, and 
surveys the road ahead. 
 
 
1 Introduction 
 
Cliometrics, sometimes called econometric history, uses statistical analysis of 
largescale numerical data to test historical hypotheses. Until only a few years ago, 
this field of research was unknown in South Africa. Emerging in US economics 
departments in the 1960s (Greif, 1997), cliometrics took off in the 2000s owing to 
two related technologies: cheap computing power and software packages to analyse 
large datasets, and the large-scale digitalisation and transcription of historical data. 
Interest in the field has been driven not only by supply-side factors, though, but 
also by demand from researchers. Economists have realised that ‘history matters’ 
for explaining economic growth and comparing levels and trajectories of economic 
development. After at least two decades of the ‘cultural turn’ in history, influenced 
by postmodernist ideas that pushed against a positivist epistemology, historians 
have rediscovered the value of transcribing large numbers of historical documents 
and analysing them statistically (Hopkins, 2009). This is nowhere more apparent 
than in Africa, where economic history is experiencing a ‘renaissance’ (Austin & 
Broadberry, 2014) and a ‘data revolution’ (Fourie, 2016). 
 
                                                        
1 I would like to thank Willem H. Boshoff, Sophia du Plessis, Bokang Mpeta, Dieter von Fintel, the students 
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comments on an earlier version of this paper. I apologise for any remaining errors of omission. The research 
reported here would not have been possible without support from the Department of Economics, the Faculty 
of Economic and Management Science’s Elite Fund, and the National Research Foundation. 
*LEAP, Department of Economics, Stellenbosch University. Email: johanf@sun.ac.za 
A 
 
2 J.STUD.ECON.ECONOMETRICS, 2018, 42(2) 
 
 
 
 
 
In South Africa the use of descriptive statistics was commonplace in economic 
history research during the twentieth century (De Kock, 1924; De Kiewiet, 1941; 
Worden, 1985; Van Duin & Ross, 1987; Shell, 1994), but the past decade has seen 
a pronounced increase in the number of papers that use statistical and econometric 
tools to investigate South African economic history questions (Fourie & Schirmer, 
2012). This paper reviews some of this recent literature, presents five new 
contributions published in this special issue of Studies in Economics and 
Econometrics, and discusses the way forward. The five papers present not only the 
latest methods used by South African cliometricians but also the diverse research 
topics they investigate. 
 
2 The precolonial period 
 
The precolonial period is the part of South African economic history we understand 
least well. While archaeological evidence and oral histories offer some insights, the 
lack of written numeric information prevents us from analysing wages or prices 
systematically in order to measure the living standards of people who lived in South 
Africa before European settlers arrived. 
 
This has not prevented economic historians from exploiting the sources that are 
available. Delius and Schirmer (2014) use archaeological evidence from the area 
called Bokoni, a settlement that between 1500 and 1820 intensively farmed terraced 
fields stretching 150 kilometres along the eastern escarpment of Mpumalanga, the 
largest known terraced site in Africa. The authors argue that the Bokoni people 
formed part of a ‘decentralised cooperative regional order’ that was built around 
the logic of production and then replaced in the early nineteenth century by ‘a new 
order built around the logic of extraction and war’ which ‘militated against the 
development of decentralised intensive farming and emphasised instead the 
accumulation of military technology most notably guns and the construction of 
military strongholds’ (Delius & Schirmer, 2014, p.37). 
 
The lack of wage and price information available during this period has forced 
economic historians and other social scientists to be more creative. A growing body 
of evidence has combined archival and oral sources with climatic and 
environmental information (Nash & Endfield, 2002; Klein et al., 2018), such as 
tree rings and ships’ logs (Hannaford, Jones & Bigg, 2015; Hannaford & Nash, 
2016). Klein et al. (2018) show how changing rainfall patterns can influence 
migration patterns and cause conflict, a notable example being the ‘wars of 
calamity’ in Southern Africa (or mfecane) that followed when a volcanic eruption 
in Indonesia in 1815 caused climate changes. 
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But often the first-order challenge is to enumerate precolonial populations. To 
count the Khoesan,2 Fourie and Green (2015) combine the opgaafrolle, the 
eighteenth and nineteenth-century tax censuses of settler households with diary 
entries of settler farmers connected to the colonial economy. In this issue, La Croix 
incorporates new archival information to revise their estimates. 
 
3 European settlement 
 
The arrival and settlement of European immigrants at the southern tip of Africa had 
a profound effect on the trajectory of economic development. The motley crew of 
European men who arrived in April 1652 to establish a refreshment station had no 
intention of colonising a territory; their purpose, as dictated by the Dutch East India 
Company, was to build, as cheaply as possible, a fort in Table Bay to supply food 
and fuel to ships rounding the Cape of Good Hope. Vegetables were to be grown 
in a garden around the fort and meat was to be obtained by trading with the local 
indigenous groups that inhabited most of what later would become the Cape 
Province. Of course, things were not that simple. The commander of the Cape 
station soon had to release Company servants to become farmers, beginning a 
process of gradual colonisation that would ultimately lead to the disintegration of 
Khoesan society, the arrival of thousands of Indian Ocean slaves and the high levels 
of inequality that characterise modern-day South Africa. 
 
This history is familiar, but recent cliometric investigations into the nature of this 
small but consequential settler society have made some surprising discoveries. 
While historians have typically considered the eighteenth-century Cape to be an 
‘economic and social backwater’3, recent investigations, using information on 
wages and assets, show that the average Cape settler lived far above the subsistence 
level (Du Plessis & Du Plessis, 2012; Fourie, 2013b). This is because, as first 
suggested by Robert Ross three decades ago, the Cape economy was more dynamic 
than earlier accounts would suggest (Van Duin & Ross, 1987). As Boshoff and 
Fourie show (2008; 2010), Cape farmers responded to the demand from the 
increasingly frequent and longer-staying ships. The more than 6,000 sailors and 
soldiers who visited Cape Town each year during the eighteenth century provided 
a market for wheat, meat and, in particular, Cape wine. But it is the supply side that 
ultimately explains the settlers’ high living standards: their access to inexpensive 
land (once the pastoral Khoe had been either pushed to the colonial frontier or 
drawn into the colonial economy), their use of slave labour, and the skills and 
institutions they had brought from Europe. Fourie and Von Fintel (2014) show that 
Huguenots from wine-making regions in France were more productive than those 
                                                        
2 A collective term for the pastoral Khoe and hunter-gatherer San who inhabited the south-western region of 
southern Africa when Europeans arrived. 
3 See Trapido (1990, p.78). 
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from wheat-producing regions. Fourie and Swanepoel (2018) show that networks 
of debt were deeply embedded in Cape society and used mostly for investment 
rather than consumption. 
 
The European population at the Cape was initially augmented by migration, but 
high fertility rates soon took over and became the main reason for the territorial 
expansion. Using genealogical data, Cilliers and Mariotti (2017) plot these rates for 
the first time over the entire eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. While the average 
settler was relatively affluent, at least by the standards of the day, the averages mask 
high levels of inequality, even within settler society (Fourie & Von Fintel, 2010; 
Fourie & Von Fintel, 2011). 
 
Much of the inequality in Cape society, though, was a consequence of the slave 
trade. The Cape economy depended on slave labour brought in from the Indian 
Ocean regions of modern-day Malaysia, Indonesia, India and Mozambique. 
Historians of the 1980s and 1990s had already begun to analyse the wealth of 
documents recording slave transactions, yet these contributions were mostly 
descriptive, focusing on estimates of population size and productivity (Worden, 
1985; Shell, 1994). More recent contributions have used rigorous econometric 
approaches to understand the causes and consequences of slavery at the Cape. 
Baten and Fourie (2015) use the ages listed in court records to calculate numeracy 
levels and trends for Khoesan and imported slaves from Africa and Asia. Du 
Plessis, Jansen and Von Fintel (2015) use hedonic slave price indices and the value 
of the marginal productivity of slave labour to construct annual returns to 
investments in slave labour. They find that large-scale farmers enjoyed high returns 
to slavery over most of the period, while small-scale farmers did not recoup the 
costs of their slaves from agricultural production alone. This suggests that the 
small-scale farmers were either overinvesting in slavery (perhaps for status 
reasons) or using slave labour profitably outside of agriculture. Fourie (2013a) uses 
probate inventories to provide evidence for the ‘economies of scope’ that 
investments in slave labour offered. 
 
Land was, of course, as important as labour for this pre-industrial society. Analysing 
the relationship between household composition and land availability in the Graaff-
Reinet district from 1800 to 1828, Cilliers and Green (2017) show that the number of 
children present in farming households increased with frontier closure, while the 
presence of non-family labourers decreased over time. The demand for family labour, 
they argue, was not a function of its marginal productivity. Poor households 
responded to shrinking land availability by employing relatively more family labour, 
while the wealthiest group opted for capital intensification instead. 
 
In this issue, Swanepoel and Fourie add another factor to help explain the 
dynamism of the Cape economy. Using an instrumental-variable approach, they 
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show that property rights mattered: despite the de jure loan farm property rights of 
the interior being weak, loan farms were as secure in their de facto property rights 
as freehold farms. This finding confirms that the local context in which property 
right regimes are embedded is at least as important as the property right regime 
itself. 
 
4 The mineral revolution 
 
The discovery of diamonds in the 1860s and gold two decades later transformed 
the South African economy. As migrants flocked to the interior, new towns like 
Kimberley and Johannesburg sprang up almost overnight, increasing the demand 
not only for labour and capital to work the mines but also for produce and other 
consumables to sustain the accelerating population. Greyling and Verhoef (2015) 
calculate GDP growth estimates for the Cape Colony, and find that GDP per capita 
grew 4.9% annually, while annual population growth was on average 3.9%. This 
was faster than the GDP per capita growth of other settler colonies like Australia 
and New Zealand (Magee, Greyling & Verhoef, 2016). What characterised this 
period, however, was ‘the high volatility in the Cape Colony GDP throughout this 
period’ (Greyling & Verhoef, 2015, p.36). 
 
Much of this growth was a consequence of new technologies that improved 
transport and communications. Herranz-Loncán and Fourie (2018) calculate that 
the impact of connecting Cape Town to the new mining towns of the interior 
explains almost half of the growth observed during the last three decades of the 
nineteenth century. Railroads connected Cape farmers and international markets to 
the interior demand, devastating the Basutoland economy, but integrating South 
Africa into the global market (Boshoff & Fourie, 2017). 
 
Gwaindepi (2018, p.ii-iii) uses the colonial blue books to show that income from 
the state-owned railway system was the second most important revenue item and 
combined with customs revenue formed the backbone of the Cape Colony’s fiscal 
capacity development. He notes, however, that in its last days the Colony found 
itself ‘in dire circumstances with high public debt and diminishing revenues’ 
because of increasing rivalry with neighbouring colonies, like Natal, that captured 
the Cape’s customs revenues and railway earnings. And, furthermore, the 
‘expenditure side was dominated by the elite-driven railway construction that 
primarily served the mining interests at the expense of all other sectors’. This meant 
that ‘businessmen with mining interests steered the government towards policies or 
actions beneficial to their interests through legislation that prevented direct taxation 
on them’. 
 
 
6 J.STUD.ECON.ECONOMETRICS, 2018, 42(2) 
 
 
 
 
 
Owing to poor record-keeping, we know much less about the livelihoods of the 
Boer Republics - the Orange Free State and the South African Republic. Du Plessis 
and Du Plessis (2017) take a novel approach to identify differences between the 
two Boer Republics. They use a statistical technique, Procrustes analysis, to gauge 
the accuracy of map boundaries in both republics as a proxy for institutional culture. 
They find evidence that, owing to its poor institutional quality, the South African 
Republic suffered a conditional resource curse after the discovery of gold. 
 
Colonial mining and political interests clashed over the sovereignty of the Boer 
republics and contributed, ultimately, to the outbreak of the Second Anglo-Boer 
War in 1899, the largest and most expensive colonial war ever fought in the British 
Empire. Fourie, Grundlingh and Mariotti (2017) use attestation forms of the South 
African Constabulary, a volunteer force of recruits born in various parts of the 
British Empire. These forms, containing the personal information of 10,399 
recruits, made it possible to assess and compare living standards in the late-
nineteenth century British territories. 
 
Despite the annexation of the Boer Republic capitals of Bloemfontein and Pretoria 
within the first year, the Boer guerrilla tactics prolonged the war for another two 
years. This had deadly consequences, notably in the temporary concentration 
camps, built to house the non-combatants fleeing Lord Kitchener’s scorched-earth 
policies. Du Plessis and Fourie (2016) use Elizabeth van Heyningen’s transcribed 
lists of concentration camp inmates and survival analysis methods to investigate 
the length of stay and chances of survival in the camps. They calculate that the 
average stay in the camps was 278 days and that 23% of the inmates died. Their 
survival analysis shows that inmates from the Cape Colony remained in the camps 
longest. Although more women died in the camps, the probability that an individual 
would die after joining a camp was almost equal for men and women. 
 
The end of the war brought the four territories into the Union of South Africa in 
1910. The mineral revolution had vastly transformed the interior of South Africa. 
Ramela (2018) uses census documents to plot the evolution of the occupational 
structure of the Cape Colony between 1875 and 1909, and for South Africa as a 
whole between 1911 and 1953. He shows, using the PST classification system, how 
the mineral revolution shifted occupations for white South Africans from the 
primary to the secondary and tertiary sectors and pushed black workers into the 
primary sector, resulting in large racial cleavages in the workforce. Cilliers and 
Fourie (2018) also use occupations, obtained from genealogical records, to 
investigate occupational mobility for white males during the mineral revolution. 
Consistent with Ramela’s (2018) evidence of a shift away from agriculture as the 
economy’s dominant sector, they find increasing mobility for white males after the 
discovery of minerals in 1867. They find upward mobility for semi-skilled white 
male workers, ‘but virtually no improved mobility for sons of farmers’ (Cilliers & 
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Fourie, 2018, p.3). Higher mobility for white males, they suggest, may have been 
a consequence of downward mobility for black males. 
 
5 Segregation and apartheid 
 
Twentieth-century South Africa exacerbated these racial disparities. Repressive 
and discriminatory legislation, such as the Colour Bar (job reservation) and the 
Land Act, protected the interests of the voter majority, mostly white men.4 The 
National Party, elected in 1948, introduced further policies that intervened in 
almost all aspects of society and continued until the 1980s, when the process of 
reform began that led to the 1994 democratic elections in South Africa. 
 
Several studies provide an overview of the macro-economy during the twentieth 
century (Fedderke & Simkins, 2012; Du Plessis & Kotzé, 2010) or general poverty 
and inequality trends (Nattrass & Seekings, 2011; Van der Berg, 2011), but because 
we lack consistent series on earnings or wealth for black South Africans, we have 
only limited understanding of the rise and fall of black living standards over that 
time. Mpeta, Fourie and Inwood (2018) address this by using four sources that 
contain records of heights: information available in the attestations of Second 
World War recruits, a dataset on cadavers, the Demographic and Health Survey, 
and the National Income Dynamics Survey. Height, or average stature of a 
population, is widely used as a proxy for living standards (Steckel, 1995). 
Combining the four sources reveals the change in heights of black males over the 
twentieth century: a decline during the first three decades, which the authors 
attribute to disease, war and land expropriation, followed by a sharp increase during 
the 1930s, probably as a result of expanded employment opportunities in mining, 
then after 1948 a slow increase. They also compare the heights of black and white 
males from the same sources, showing the persistently high levels of inequality 
between the two groups. 
 
Information on heights can also reveal the causal effects of short-term shocks. 
Mariotti (2015) uses the unexpected increase in employment in 1975, 1976 and 
1977 in the South African black ‘homelands’ or ‘Bantustans’ to compare the long-
term adult outcomes of children whose fathers benefited from the employment 
increase with those whose fathers did not. Using a standard difference-in-difference 
approach, she finds ‘that the (income) shock affected males who were either new-
born or in utero at the time, providing support for the foetal-origins hypothesis and 
showing the importance of mother’s nutrition’ (Mariotti, 2015, p.485). 
 
                                                        
4 White women only received the franchise in 1930, and coloured voters were finally removed from the 
voters’ roll in the Cape Province in 1951. 
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The theoretical reasons for the emergence and decline of apartheid was a topic of 
much discussion in the 1980s and 1990s.5 More recent contributions have tended 
towards the empirical, relying on newly transcribed surveys and censuses. Mariotti 
(2012b) investigates, for example, the apartheid-era labour market. She shows that 
skill acquisition by white workers reduced the supply of semi-skilled workers 
throughout the apartheid era, and that this ultimately led to the removal of job 
reservation. She also shows that the elasticity of substitution between white and 
black production workers remained fairly high despite changes in the technology 
used in manufacturing, despite changes in the allocation of jobs to black and white 
workers, and despite the increasing differences in skills between white and black 
workers (Mariotti, 2012a). This suggests that ‘African and white workers were 
substitutes throughout apartheid notwithstanding legislation restricting the types of 
jobs that African workers could do’ (Mariotti, 2012a, p.47). 
 
Nattrass (2014) calculates industrial profitability between 1960 and 1989. She finds 
that ‘Marxist claims about cheap labour being the basis for supposedly rising 
profitability and growth under apartheid are not supported by the data’. Instead, she 
finds a decline in profitability and attributes it to falling capital productivity – which 
suggests that ‘investment in the late apartheid period was misdirected in significant 
ways’ (Nattrass, 2014, p.245). In this issue, Rönnbäck and Broberg calculate the 
return on British investments in South Africa during the period 1869 to 1969 and 
find it was substantially lower than what some previous research in the field has 
claimed. 
 
Apartheid-era legislation affected not only the labour market but almost every 
aspect of South Africans’ lives, including education (Eriksson, 2014; Giliomee, 
2009), fertility decisions (Norling, 2018; Burger, Burger & Rossouw, 2012), and 
migration. Abel (2015) shows how apartheid-era forced removals still affect South 
Africans’ attitudes today. In this issue, Dieter von Fintel questions why spatial 
inequality persists in South Africa, with the former Bantustans being notably 
poorer, despite the removal of apartheid-era barriers to migration. Apartheid also 
isolated South Africa from the rest of the world, yet new trade and migration 
networks were nevertheless created. Also in this issue, Edward Kerby examines the 
links between trade flows and Taiwanese migration to South Africa from 1975 to 
1995. He finds that the share of South African exports to Taiwan was both greater 
and more diversified in the sectors in which Taiwanese immigrants invested. 
Already before the end of apartheid, strong business and supply chain networks had 
been formed between South Africa and Asian markets. 
 
 
                                                        
5 See Mariotti and Fourie (2014) for a detailed review. 
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6 Conclusions 
 
Historical statistics, often used for purposes orthogonal to the original reason for 
their collection, can help to offset the colonial biases of some qualitative sources, 
including those from South Africa, where history writing was often the domain of 
the privileged. Exploring large individual-level sources, such as marriage records, 
death notices, prison and military records, voters’ rolls and probate inventories, can 
bring to light a wealth of new information about the (economic) lives of South 
Africans that have hitherto remained largely uncharted. 
 
The good news is that the shift towards more cliometric studies in South African 
history has only just begun. As the attentive reader will notice, most of the studies 
cited above were published in the last five years. Several research projects now 
underway at South African and international universities, often in close 
collaboration, suggest that much more can be expected in the coming years.6 
 
But more should be done to attract young black South Africans into the field. There 
are good (economic) reasons why this will be a slow process. Black economists are 
sought after in both the private and public sectors, and are woefully 
underrepresented in Economics departments across South Africa. And because 
most History departments do not teach quantitative history, young black historians 
are often not equipped with the statistical skills to benefit from the data revolution. 
Offering generous bursaries is a good start. So, too, is encouraging students to enrol 
in international programmes where they can acquire new methods and approaches. 
The cliometric revolution in South Africa is just taking off. Let us ensure it will be 
open to all. 
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